Routine remand periods: the next-hearing clock

What a remand order does

A remand interval is the period authorised by the particular order until the next appearance or procedural stage. A custody time limit is the cumulative limit on pre-trial custody for the relevant proceedings. A valid next-hearing date cannot extend a CTL. Equally, knowing the CTL does not tell the client when the next remand hearing occurs. Maintain both dates.

Under MCA 1980 s 128, the ordinary magistrates’ court custodial remand is limited to eight clear days, subject to statutory exceptions. “Clear days” exclude both the day on which the order is made and the return day; count the complete intervening days. This is not “eight business days”. Ordinary weekends and bank holidays count within the interval unless a specific exception applies.

The qualified longer remand

Section 128A permits a longer custodial remand where the defendant is before the court, has already been remanded in custody for the same offence, and the court has heard the parties’ representations and fixed the expected date of the next stage of proceedings. The remand cannot exceed 28 clear days or the interval to that next stage, whichever ends earlier. The next stage must be a genuine procedural stage; simply selecting a long return date does not prove the conditions.

The power therefore does not normally authorise a 28-day first custodial remand. Nor can “same defendant” replace “same offence”. A qualifying longer remand leaves intact the defendant’s ability to apply for bail during the interval. Lawful live-link attendance can count as presence; do not mistake it for a waiver and an entirely unattended hearing.

Absence and other exceptions are not automatic extensions

Under s 128(3A)–(3E), a custodial remand in absence has specific representation and consent conditions, and cannot be used for more than three successive remands without bringing the defendant back before the court. The consent must not have been withdrawn and a legal representative must remain acting. This route cannot follow a section 128A remand exceeding eight clear days or itself be used to make such a longer remand. Where the absent defendant cannot validly be further remanded by that route, section 128(3C)–(3E) requires the shortest adjournment needed for production or production at the earliest possible time. It does not displace section 128A’s conditions. An absent defendant’s bail application also needs the separate CrimPR 14.2 analysis. “The solicitor attends” is not a universal absence power.

Section 129 addresses inability to attend through illness or accident: where the court is satisfied that this prevents attendance at the end of a remand, it can further remand in absence, and the ordinary eight-day limit does not apply to that further remand. Under s 128(6)(a), a longer remand on bail is possible with the defendant’s and other party’s consent. Section 128 also permits the particular statutory trial-adjournment remands and, in the specified either-way situation, remand until a court properly constituted and sitting in the appropriate place can proceed with summary trial. The ordinary eight-day limit therefore is not a universal limit on every remand. In the limited police-inquiry situation under s 128(7)–(8), a custodial remand to police custody is constrained by the statutory inquiry purpose and a three-clear-day ceiling, with return when the purpose ends. None of these provisions silently enlarges the applicable CTL.

The Crown Court does not use the magistrates’ eight- or 28-clear-day formula for every adjournment. It can remand to a procedural stage under its powers, but must still comply with the Bail Act, the applicable CTL, fair case management and the right to a trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial. A long interval does not remove access to a properly grounded bail application.

Authorities: MCA 1980, ss 128, 128A and 129; CrimPR, r 14.2; Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s 22.